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Existence and resistance: 
The phenomenology of mind-independence 
 
 
 I shall defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal 
access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address an objection 
against the very possibility of experiencing mind-independence. The possibility of an 
experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience 
of resistance is the kind of experience by which we access mind-independence. 
 
1. Is a phenomenology of reality possible? 
 
 1.1. Two different questions 
 
 Two questions arise concerning the connection between appearances and reality. First: 
are appearances real? Second: is reality apparent? When we ask about the reality of 
appearances, we try to understand whether the objects presented to us in experience exist 
independently of this experience. When we ask about the appearance of reality we try to know 
whether the objects of our experience are presented to us as independent of our experience. 
Historically, the first question is the most important one: do the direct objects of our 
perceptual experiences exist independently of their perception? Direct realism answers yes, 
while indirect realism and phenomenalism answer no, claiming that the immediate objects of 
our perceptual acts are mind-dependent sense-data. I shall address the second question, which 
concerns the phenomenology of reality: do the direct objects of our perceptions appear as 
mind-independent? Can we experience the very “moment of reality”1 of perceptual objects? 
Let us call the positive answer to this question the thesis of the phenomenality of 
independence (PI). 
 
 (PI) The mind-independence of perceptual objects can be experienced. 
 
 Hume clearly rejects PI:  
                                                
1 The expression is from M. Scheler. 
 
 As to the independency of our perceptions on ourselves, this can never be an object of 
 the senses. Treatise, 1.4.2. 
 
 I shall try, contra Hume, to defend PI.  
 
 1.2. Direct realism and Phenomenal Independence 
 
 Two remarks are in order concerning the relations between the questions of the reality 
of appearances and the question of the appearance of reality. First, these two questions are 
prima facie independent. This is one thing to ask whether the objects of perception are mind-
independent; this is another to ask whether their mind-independence can be perceived. For 
instance, one can be a phenomenalist and agree that there is a phenomenology of reality. It is 
sufficient for that to adopt an error theory of perception: the objects of perception appear to be 
mind-independent, but this aspect of the perceptual content is systematically illusory. 
Conversely, it is possible to be a direct realist and to reject the phenomenality of 
independence: we may see mind-independent objects without seeing them as mind-
independent. Though the objects of perception are real, this is an aspect of them that is not 
accessible in experience.  
 This doesn’t mean however, that these two questions are not closely related. Though 
direct realism and the phenomenology of reality are not necessarily tied, they fit nicely 
together. The question of the phenomenology of reality has some important consequences 
concerning the epistemology of realism. If there is a phenomenology of reality, then there is 
an empiricist answer to the question “how do you know that the stone is real?” The answer is 
the same as to the question: “how do you know that the stone is round”, namely: “Because I 
see it.” As an internalist answer2, it cannot refute sceptic objections such as the arguments of 
the deceiving God or of the brain in a vat. But it may help to refute other kind of objections 
against realism, such as the (conceptual) quietist’s challenge according to which the notion of 
reality is not meaningful (possible answer: it is meaningful in so far as it is grounded in 
perception). The general idea is to avoid reluctance raised by the putative unobservable nature 
of mind-independence. 
 
                                                
2 This answer is internalist in the sense the evidence for the existence of an external world are perceptually 
accessible to the subject. Following L. Bonjour (1992), I take internalism to be compatible with direct realism. 
 1.3. Definitions 
 
 I shall admit the following definitions. What is real is what is mind-independent. More 
precisely, since I will be interested here only in the reality of the objects of our experiences, I 
shall define the reality of an object as follows: 
 
 x is real iff its existence x is independent of its being perceived (= of the  existence of 
 any perceptual act that takes x for its object)3.  
 
 As for perception, I agree that in order to perceive, the subject must have some 
phenomenal access to the content of his perception. Perception is a kind of experience. 
Consequently, blindsight subjects do not see, although the world is under their eyes and 
makes some difference to their behaviour. Phenomenality, or the fact that perceptual content 
makes some subjective difference, is necessary for perception.4 However, it does not imply 
that it is sufficient. This phenomenological condition is quite compatible with the view that 
perceptual verbs are factive: illusions may not be perceptions. Moreover, I take it that the 
objects of our experience are not simple, uncomposed, whole or blobs: we may perceive only 
certain parts, properties or aspects of an object. Therefore, we may not see the reality of an 
object, although the perception of some of its other aspects is veridical (in the same way, we 
can feel the temperature of an object without feeling its colour5). Finally, an appearance is 
whatever is presented to S in experience. 
 
 
 
 
 1.3. The Trouble with PI 
 
                                                
3 One important problem with this definition of realism in terms of mind-independence is that it threatens the 
reality of mental states, existential dependence being apparently reflexive. I think this threat can be met if we 
insist on the fact that the definition asserts not only that real entities must be independent of mental states, but 
also, that they must be independent of their being represented by mental states. This may solve the problem of 
the reality of the mind (see J.Heil, 2003 : 58-59). 
4 I’m reluctant to say that one must be conscious of the content of his perception, because I don’t want to exclude 
the possibility of unconscious phenomenality, but consciousness may still help to understand the point. 
5 This is compatible with a transparent use of perceptual verbs if we admit that differents properties of a same 
object can be perceived separately. 
The question of the phenomenal character of reality has received less attention than the 
debate about direct realism6, maybe because its answer seems obvious to many. Some would 
say that the answer is trivially positive: it is a basic phenomenological fact that the perceptual 
world appears to be independent. Others think on the contrary that the answer is trivially 
negative. According to them, the impossibility of experiencing reality follows from the very 
definition of reality in terms of mind-independence. If being real means existing unperceived, 
the reality of an object is not something we can perceive, for this would imply to perceive an 
unperceived object. I shall try to show in this first part that this objection relies on some 
dubious conceptions of existential (in)dependence (namely, temporal or modal ones), and that 
as soon as existential dependence is understood in terms of essence or ground, there is no 
more absurdity in claiming that mind-independence can be experienced. 
 
 
 1.4. The temporal approach of existential dependence. 
 
Many usual definition of existential dependence imply that the mind-independence of 
perceptual objects cannot figure in the phenomenal content of our experiences. According to a 
first approach, a perceptual object is independent of perception if and only if it existed before, 
or continues to exist after its perception. This is a temporal definition of independence: 
 
 (TI) x is real if and only if there is a least one time at which x exists without being 
 perceived.  
 
 If this is what is meant by “the reality” of an object, then it becomes obvious that this 
reality cannot be perceived. Not (or not only) because this would imply to perceive times that 
are not contemporaneous to the act of perception. But mainly because to see the reality of an 
object would implies to see an unseen object. Trying to perceive the mind-independence of 
perceptual objects would be as impossible as to try to see if the light of the fridge is on when 
                                                
6 In a recent paper, Susanna Siegel make the same distinction between these two questions, and address the 
second one, concerning the phenomenology of independence. Nevertheless, she doesn’t address the issue of the 
phenomenology of existential independence, but only the one of independence of the variation of properties 
(especially location properties) with respect to the variation of the position of the perceiver. (“Subject and Object 
in the Contents of Visual Experience”, June 2005). 
the door is closed. The empiricist realist who believes only what he sees and who believes that 
there are some unseen things, must be seeing unseen things7. 
 
But TI certainly asks too much. Actually existing unperceived is indeed a sufficient 
condition for existing independently of perception, but this condition is not necessary. Take 
events. The preceding temporal definition of independence implies that if a clap of thunder is 
wholly heard, it is dependent upon its being heard since it didn’t existed before nor will exist 
after its being heard. This strange conclusion generalises if perdurantism is true: if persistent 
objects consist in spatio-temporal worms with temporal parts, and if these temporal parts are 
the only ‘things’ we perceive, then every object of perception is necessarily dependent upon 
its perception. Far from securing phenomenalism, such a temporal definition of independence 
trivializes it. We need a notion of independence that allows shaping the debate between 
realism and anti-realism in a substantial way. 
 
 1.5. The modal approach of existential dependence 
 
The obvious move is to switch from a temporal to a modal notion of mind-
independence. What must be required, for a perceptual object to be real, is that it could exist 
without being perceived. 
 
(MI) x is real if and only if there is at least one possible world in which x exists 
without being perceived. 
 
Such a definition solves the precedent worries concerning the reality of events and 
temporal parts. Does it allow for the perception of reality? That is, is it possible to perceive an 
object as possibly existing without being perceived? To put it in the language of possible 
worlds: can we perceive an object as existing unperceived in at least one possible world? It 
might sound strange to bring possibility into the content of perception. For one thing, 
intuitively, only the actual world can be perceived. It is dubious that we can perceptually 
experience possible worlds. Consider first the possibilist, who thinks that possible worlds 
                                                
7See Hume: Thus Hume writes:  
 
To begin with the SENSES, ‘tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu’d 
existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and 
supposes that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas’d all manner of operationTreatise, 1.4.2. 
9 For Lewis (1986) x and y live in the same world iff they are spatiotemporally related. 
really exist beyond our own actual world. How could we perceive a possible world from our 
actual world? These worlds may be conceived, or imagined, but it is hard to understand how 
they can be perceived. For perception seems to require some spatial, temporal and causal 
relations between the subject and the object, and no such relation holds between possible 
worlds9. Indeed, when asked how to determine the actual world among all those worlds, 
David Lewis answers that “ ‘Actual’ is an indexical like ‘I’ or ‘Here’” (Counterfactuals: 86). 
Indexicals are usually taken to be closely dependent on perception. This suggests a stronger 
reason why perception can’t go farther than the actual world: if a possible world were 
perceptible from the actual world, it would collapse into the actual world. Consider now the 
actualist, who claims that only one world exists, the actual one. If he grants that modal 
discourse is intelligible and purports to state the facts10, he will try to account for possible 
worlds in terms of actual entities. There are many options here and I can’t go through each 
one of them. Just to take two, possible worlds can be treated as actual but abstract entities, 
such as set of sentences or unexemplified properties. But clearly, abstract entities can no more 
be seen than alien worlds (intuition may be an epistemological option, but it is not 
perception). Possible worlds can also be treated as combinations of actual and concrete 
entities. Here again, if concrete entities can be perceived, their possible combinations are not 
reachable by perception: we can see the horse, we can see the narwhal, be we cannot see the 
unicorn. In conclusion, however we construe possible worlds, we are driven back to the 
intuition that only actual objects can be perceived11. Their non-actual counterparts lie beyond 
our perceptual reach12. This conclusion is of course disastrous for the Phenomenality of 
                                                
10 I’m here paraphrasing Fine, « The problem of possibilia ». 
11 It has been challenged. J.J. Gibson (1986 : 127sqq) claims that objects affords their different possible uses (the 
apple is seen as eatable, the terrestrial surfaces as climb-on-able, etc). But Gibson has no interest for the 
phenomenology of experience: as soon as we focus on what is immediately present to us, it is quite intuitive to 
claim that the actual apple is all what we see, and that on the basis of this perception, we anticipate, expect, 
imagine or conceive different possible actions. These non-perceptual mental events can arise spontaneously, 
non-inferentially, from the perception of the apple, but they remain distinct from it. Moreover, even if the 
possible use of object were perceivable, this would be of little help if we are to secure a phenomenology for 
reality; for the possibility we need to access is not a possibility of use, but a possibility of existence unperceived. 
12 A related problem is that, granting the perceptual accessibility of the possible worlds, however we construe 
them, we still to experience several worlds at once. need different experiences in order to access mind-
independence of an object. For we need one experience of the actual object, and another experience of the 
possible, unperceived object. Even if the experience of an actual object is conjoined with the experience of its 
possible, unperceived, counterparts, there is no singular experience that present us with mind-independency. 
This problem is more acute when we consider mind-dependence. We certainly want to maintain that the mind-
dependence of a pain is experimented. But if dependence is understood in modal terms, this would mean that we 
experience a huge number of possible worlds (maybe all of them) at once. How can a single pain experience do 
this?  
 
Independence, since in order to perceptually access to the reality of an object, we need to 
perceive at least one possible counterpart of this object that is not perceived. 
 The second problem that MI raised for PI, is that even if we were able to perceptually 
access possible worlds, it would remain absurd to claim that we can see an unseen object, be it 
possible. This object may be non-perceived in its world, but it will be perceived from our 
world13. What is true of TI is still true of MI: since both define existential independence in 
terms of (non-present or non-actual) existence unperceived, it is trivially impossible to 
perceive the reality of an object. 
 This conclusion is not devastating for realism: it only shows that the claim that the 
world exists independently of our perception cannot be justified on the sole ground of our 
perceptual contents. When asked “How do you know that the stone is round”, we can 
plausibly answer “Because I see it”. But to the question “How do you know that the stone is 
real”, we can no more answer “Because I perceive it”. Our belief in the reality of the stone 
must be either justified by extra-perceptive considerations, such as inference to the best 
explanation; or granted to be a basic, unjustified and incorrigible belief: we may be so 
constituted that we spontaneously believe in the reality of the object of perception. Be it as it 
may, MI implies that perception cannot justify the belief in the mind-independence of external 
objects for the simple reason that mind-independence cannot be perceived. Nevertheless, it 
would certainly be a good news for the realist if the reality of perceptual objects could be 
perceived as such.  
But there is still hope. It may be a mistake to define mind-dependence in terms of 
possible existence unperceived. Suppose that God exists, that he is a necessary being, that he 
sees everything, that he created the world and its laws a long time ago, and that he no more 
intervenes in it except for sporadic miracles. According to the modal notion of independence, 
the world then existentially depends on the perception of God: no objects are real since 
                                                
13 This may be a perceptual version of Berkeley’s so-called “Master’s Argument”: 
 
HYLAS. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and 
unperceived by any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that 
manner. 
PHILONOUS. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen? 
HYLAS. No, that were a contradiction. 
 PHILONOUS. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived? First 
Dialogue, p. 86. 
 This argument is widely reject as far as it concerns conceptions (although there is little agreement on the 
reasons of its unsoundness), but it seems at least correct as far as perception of possibility is concerned. 
nothing could possibly exist without his perception14. But this is strongly counter-intuitive: for 
even if the world can’t exist without being perceived, it is not here because God perceives it 
that the world exists. The world appears to follow its course independently of any perception 
of God. If God is not almighty, the world may even resist God’s will. The perceptions of God 
appear to be purely epiphenomenal in this story. Yet the Modal view of Independence implies 
that they determine the reality of objects. So the Modal view of Independence appears to be 
false: possibly existing unperceived is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for 
existential independence15. The general problem with the modal approach of existential 
independence is that it registers only the fact that in each world where x exists, y exists, but it 
remains silent about the source of such a correlation. The correlation may be due to the 
dependent nature of x, but it may as well be due to the necessary nature of y. We wish to 
exclude the latter case. 
 
 1.6. The essentialist and foundational approaches of existential dependence. 
 
 As an alternative, K. Fine (1995) and J. Lowe (1998) have proposed to define 
existential dependence with the help of the notion of the identity (or essence) of an object16. 
The notion of essence is taken to be modally irreducible: the essence of a thing is what makes 
it what it is, its real definition (Fine, 1994). Every essential property is a necessary property 
but not every necessary property is essential. To take an example from Fine, it is necessary 
that Socrates is distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but this is not essential to him. In the same 
                                                
14 I’ve adapted the God example proposed by P. Simons (1987: 295) to the case of perception. For more detailed 
critics of the modal conception of dependence, see Fine 1994, 1995; Lowe 1998, chap. 6; Correia, 2005. Jenkins 
(xxx) applies this critic to the definition of realism. 
15 The defender of the modal definition of dependence that wish to preserve PI may reply that the problem here 
is not with the definition of dependence, but with the choice of the dependee, namely, God’s perceptions. It 
would be a mistake to define mind-independence in terms of independence from perception, for what matter is 
independence from the will: 
 
(MI’) x is real iff there is at least one possible world in which x exists without being willed. 
 
 This definition deals with our above example. But it is possible to construe an example which renders 
MI’ dubious in the same way. Suppose that God created the world an its laws so perfectly that the world will for 
ever follow its course in accordance with God’s will. Then it is not possible that something happen without being 
willed by God. But in that case, the fact the world necessarily conforms with God’s will doesn’t implies that the 
world depends on God’s will. If the world at t conforms with God’s will, this is not because God wills it at that 
time, but only because he created the world in such a way that such a concordance becomes necessary. Another 
possibility is that God’s will is completely determinate by the content of its perceptions, so that he necessarily 
wills what he perceived. Here again, this is not because of God’s will that the world is so and so, but rather 
because of the world being so that God wills it. If God wills everything that happens, this may be either because 
God’s will is almighty, or because his will is so weak and blissfully happy that he cannot but will everything. 
16 In fact their focus is wider since it includes every kind of dependence, not only existential ones. Lowe even 
claims that a purely essential dependence entails existential one, which is rejected by Correia (2005, 2.5.) 
way, it is necessary that if I exist, then 2+2 = 4, but I’m not essentially dependent on 2+2+ = 
4.The idea is then that x depends on y if and only if the existence of x necessarily implies the 
existence of y in virtue of the identity of x. In other words, the source of the dependence must 
rely in the dependent object in order to avoid the conclusion that everything is dependent on 
necessary beings (God, the number 2). This solves the problem of the all-seeing God: it is true 
that the world can’t exist without being perceived by God, but this is not true in virtue of the 
nature of the world. What the world is doesn’t necessitate that God perceives it (though it may 
necessitate that God created it). We arrive at the following essential definition of 
independence:  
 
 (EI) x is real iff it is not true in virtue of the identity of x (=it is not part of the essence of 
 x) that x exists only if it is perceived. 
 The mind-independence of x is compatible with its being necessarily perceived. F. 
Correia has recently given another definition of dependence in terms of ground, which avoids 
the reference to essences or natures while still excluding the trivial dependence on necessary 
beings. According to him, x depends on y iff “y’s existing helps makes x exist.” That is, an 
entity existentially depends on another when its existence is explained (in an objective sense) 
or grounded in the existence of the other. Then mind-independence can be defined as follows: 
 (FI) x is real iff its existence is not grounded in its being perceived. 
 There are important differences between EI and FI but they don’t seem to be crucial 
for our problem of the phenomenology of reality.  In both cases, mind-independence is no 
more defined in terms of existence unperceived, and this paves the way for PI. For the above 
objections against the perception of the reality of an object don’t work anymore: it seems 
possible to experience the fact that the existence of an object is not grounded in its experience.  
The absence of the experience is no more present in the content of the experience. The 
conclusion of all this is that we have no more reason to reject the possibility of an experience 
of reality. The next question is: which experience gives us access to mind-independence? 
 
 
2. What is the phenomenology of reality? 
 
 2.1. The Resistance Thesis 
 
 In his paper “Idealism and Realism”, the realist phenomenologist Max Scheler raised 
the following questions: 
 
 (1) What is the givenness of reality? What is experienced [erlbet], when anything 
 whatever is experienced as real? This is the question of the phenomenology of the 
 lived-experience of reality. (2) In what sorts of acts or modes of human behavior is the 
 factor of reality [Realitätsmoment] originally given?17 
 
Scheler’s answer is: the experience of resistance. Paradigmatic experiences of 
resistance occur when we carry a heavy bag, when we swim against the stream, or when we 
hold back a baby carriage in the stairs. According to Scheler, the experience of resistance 
gives us a direct access to the reality of the experienced objects. Let us call this the resistance 
thesis: 
 
 (RT) x is experienced as existing independently from its being experienced, if 
  and only if x is experienced as resistant to our will. 
 
Conjoined with the foundational approach of independence, the Resistance Thesis 
implies that if an object is experienced as resistant, then its existence is experienced as not 
being grounded in our experience. The intuition that the experience of resistance gives us a 
strong feeling of reality is widespread. One of the most famous examples is certainly Samuel 
Johnson’s “refutation” of Berkeley by kicking against a stone18. This refutation is generally 
held to miss the point because it tries to refute a metaphysical doctrine one the sole basis of a 
phenomenological feeling, thus conflating the question of the reality of appearances (to which 
immaterialism is an answer) with the independent question of the appearance of reality. I 
                                                
17 1973 [1927], p.313. 
18 « After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious 
sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, 
that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity 
with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, 
"I refute it thus."Boswell, Life of Johnson,  p.292. I take it that the experience of resistance was Johnson focus, 
but other interpretation have been given. It is  also possible to interpret Johnson as drawing attention to his 
experience of pain (xxx) or of pressure in the foot. 
think nevertheless we should be more lenient with Johnson’s refutation. For one thing, if there 
is a mistake, it is already present in Berkeley. Berkeley himself considers that the 
Phenomenality of Independence would be a problem for his immaterialism19. Secondly, there 
may be no mistake. For immaterialism, broadly construed, intends to be a non-revisionary 
thesis, compatible with commonsense. If so, Berkeley has better not to adopt an error theory 
concerning the phenomenology of independence.  
Beyond Johnson and Scheler, many authors have claimed for a central role of the 
experience of resistance in the genetic explanation and the epistemological justification of our 
belief in the external world: Fichte (1795), Maine de Biran (1812), Schopenhauer (1819) T. 
Brown (1827),  A. Bain (1872), Dilthey (1890), G.Heynmans (1905) J.M. Baldwin (1906) , 
G.F. Stout (1931) and, more recently, S. Hampshire (1959), A.C. Garnett (1965), D. W. 
Hamlyn (1990) T. Baldwin (1995), J. Russell (1995, 1996), A. D. Smith (2002),  and Q. 
Cassam (2005). Note that some of them are anti-realists (Fichte, Maine de Biran, 
Schopenhauer, Dilthey), while the others are realists21.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
19 Berkeley believes that the most plausible candidate for the Phenomenality of Independence is not the 
experience of resistance (RT), which he barely mentions, but the experience of the distance of the objects from 
us. He consequently takes great pains makes an effort to reject the three-dimensionality of sight and explicitly 
ties this project with his adoption of immaterialism. (See especially Principles, §43-44, and see Armstrong, 
1960 :  26sqq, for a critic of the commonly claimed connection between Berkeley’s view about the perception 
distance and his immaterialism 
Moreover, pressed to explain if God induces every man to believe erroneously in the existence of  matter, 
Philonous asks: 
 
 Whatsoever opinion we father on [God], it must be either because he has discovered it to us by 
 supernatural revelation, or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and 
 given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it. But where is the 
 revelation? Or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of matter? (Third Dialogue, p. 125.) 
This sounds very much like Scheler’s question, and I think we should read Johnson’s refutation as an attempt to 
answer it. So if it is a mistake to contest immaterialism from any feeling of independence (either distance or 
resistance), this is a mistake that Johnson inherited from Berkeley. 
21 Another debate opposes the inferentialists to the intuitionists. The inferentialists consider that the experience 
of resistance has no intrinsic intentionality and that it is only the crucial starting point of an inference whose 
conclusion is the belief in the external worlds (see especially T. Brown 1827: 151, and, to a lesser extent, 
Dilthey). The intuitionists, on the contrary, claim that the reality of objects is immediately experienced in the 
feeling of resistance. I shall focus on this intuitionist view, which is implied by RT.  
2.2. The experience of resistance 
 
 What is then to be understood by an experience of resistance”? There are, I submit, 
three necessary and conjointly sufficient conditions in order to have such an experience. 
 (i) First, a crucial point, for all the upholders of RT, is that the phenomenology of 
independence is not to be found in mere perception, but must somehow involve our actions. 
Here’s Scheler: 
 
“reality is not given to us in perceptual acts, but in our instinctive and conative 
 conduct vis-à-vis the world.”22 
 
In order to experience resistance, we have to be agents, that is, we must be exerting 
our will. The experience of resistance is not something that happens to us, but something that 
we at least partly do. Resistance is a relation between an object and an agent. It may be 
considered as the converse of the relation of effort: if O resists to A, then A makes an effort on 
O. The relation of resistance is not to be confused with the relation of force. First, we can 
experience forces without experiencing effort; for instance, when we experience pressures on 
our skin, or spontaneous contractions of ours muscles. Second, at least one term of the 
relation of resistance is an agent, while forces can hold between inert physical objects. Third, 
resistance is a non-symmetrical relation: when O resists to A, then it is not necessary that A 
resists to O (indeed, even when two agents act on each other, such as in arm-wrestling, one 
can argue that there is in fact not one symmetrical resistance relation between them, but two 
asymmetrical instances of the relation, so that resistance may be an asymmetrical relation). 
On the contrary, forces are symmetrical relations: this is at least the most plausible 
interpretation of Newton’s Third Law.  
(ii) But to be acting on something is not sufficient for having an experience of 
resistance. We must perceive at the same time the very same thing on which we act. Without 
any perceptual feedback, we could make an effort on something without ever knowing it. 
What seems specific of the experience of resistance is that we immediately perceive the very 
same object on which we are directly acting. Our volition and our perception share part of 
their content.   
(iii) This is still not sufficient: for if the perceptual and the volitional contents match 
perfectly, there is no resistance to be experienced. In order to experience resistance, there 
                                                
22 1973 [1927] : 318. 
must be a partial mismatch between the content of the volition and of the perception. An 
omnipotent God can’t experience resistance, because his will ever reaches his goal. 
As a result, the experience of resistance is a complex mental state, constituted by a 
conative act (such as a volition, or, more neutrally, an efference) and a cognitive one (such as 
a perception or an afference) whose contents are compared and discovered to mismatch. This 
story is not original: it is already to be found in Maine de Biran, Dilthey or Scheler, and is at 
the heart of the principle of reafference described by von Holst and Mittelstaedt23. Some 
details are needed, but I shall now focus on three objections against the resistance thesis. 
 
2.3. Descartes’ Objection 
 
One first objection against the resistance thesis is that the experience of resistance is 
not necessary for the experience of independence. It is sufficient to experiment the spatial 
exteriority of perceptual objects, their distance from us. The focus on the experience of the 
distance of the perceptual objects reflects the common definition of realism in terms of things 
existing “outside the mind”. Descartes clearly dismiss the necessity of the experience of 
resistance: 
 
If every time our hands moved towards any part, all the bodies in that place receded 
 as quickly as our hands approached, we should never feel hardness; and yet we have 
 no reason to believe that bodies which might thus recede would on this account lose 
 that which makes them bodies. (Principles, II, iv). 
 
Despite Descartes' declared intuition, it seems clear that something is missing in this 
world. In such a world, although we may experience the objects at a certain distance from us, 
they would plausibly not appear as independent of us. It is dubious that the experience of 
distance can give us any idea of existential independence. Independence is a formal relation, 
while distance is a material one. It is hard to understand how the mere perception of the 
distance between the eye (or the body of the perceiver) and the object could give us 
phenomenal access to the mind-independence of the seen object. First, distance is not 
sufficient for independence: pains and tickles are experienced in the three-dimensional space 
                                                
23 Holst E., von, Mittelstaedt, 1950, « Das Reafferenzprincizp. Wechselwiskungen zwischen 
Zentralnervensystem und Peripherie », Naturwissensschaften, 37, 464-476. Holst, E. von, 1954, « Relations 
between the central nervous system and the peripheral organs », British Journal of Animal Behavior, 2, 89-94 
(donné par Jeannerod 2002). 
 
of the body and they appear to be mind-dependent. Second, externality doesn’t seem 
necessary for independence: touch, for instance, is generally held to be a sense of contact, in 
which no phenomenal distance between our body and the object appears. But touch is also 
often held to be the most objective of the five senses, giving us a strong impression of reality.  
 
 2.4. The Rehmke-Heidegger-Stout’s Objection 
 
 According to a second objection, raised independently by Remhke, Heidegger and 
Stout, the Resistance Thesis is circular. The experience of resistance is supposed to give us an 
exclusive phenomenal access to the existence of a mind independent world. But, in order to 
make an effort on something, we must already be conscious that there is something.  
 
“How could the one who wills experience resistance, without presupposing the 
 external world?” Rehmke, quoted by Scheler, . 326. 
 
“The discovery of resistance, that is, of what resists our strivings, is ontologically 
 possible only on the basis of the disclosedness of the world.” Heidegger, Being and 
 Time, §43. 
 
« If this view [according to which what resists voluntary effort must be an 
 independently existing not-self] is to be taken seriously, further explanation is 
 required. It is plain that by itself it cannot claim, without an obvious petitio principii, 
 to be an account of the way in which physical objects are known. Awareness of an 
 embodied self in interaction with an embodied not-self is altready pressuposed in the 
 awareness of resisted effort. (Stout, Mind and Matter, p. 167) 
 
 The experience of resistance relies on our being able to act on things and to perceive 
the things on which we act. But both volitions and perception are intentional acts. To be in an 
intentional state implies to distinguish oneself from the independent world24. As a 
consequence, the experience of resistance cannot explain the origin nor justify our knowledge 
of the distinction between us and the world because it presupposes it. So goes the objection. 
 The answer to it is that the volitions and perceptions that enter in the experience of 
resistance are not themselves experienced: they are sub-personal states. This is why Scheler 
prefers to speak of instincts or drives rather than of volition, which suggest a central, self-
conscious act. This is also why it is misleading to speak of perception for, strictly speaking, 
there is no phenomenal intentionality in those kind of low-level states. Afference and 
efference are better names. Such states can occur in very rudimentary creatures that don’t 
make any distinction between themselves and the “external” world. So the experience of 
                                                
24 This may be why many consider the thesis of the Phenomenality of Independence as trivial. 
resistance doesn’t require any intentional states, if by this we mean states whose intentionality 
is phenomenally given (these states may still be intentional in a weaker, non-
phenomenological causal sense). Therefore, no subjective distinction between oneself and the 
world is assumed before the experience of resistance. The phenomenal world of a creature 
deprived of any experience of resistance is akin to the world of the neutral monist: there is no 
intentionality, no act-object distinction there25. Or course, the creature and the world are in 
fact metaphysically distinct, but this is a distinction that the creature doesn’t access.  
 This is only when we experience resistance that we come to realize the distinction 
between the world and ourselves. The experience of resistance, therefore, grounds 
phenomenal intentionality, not the contrary. Phenomenally, the experience of resistance 
should be understood as an internal relation in the following strong sense: a relation that 
constitutes its terms. The subject and the external world, so to speak, spread out from the 
experience of resistance. Strong anti-realist may go so far as understanding this 
metaphysically. But the point here is weaker: the experience of the resistance doesn’t generate 
the ontological distinction between the self and the world but the phenomenological 
distinction between the experienced self and the experienced world. Through it, existential 
independence of the world from the self comes to be known. 
 
 2.5. A last objection: generalized VS restricted resistance theses 
 
 Here is a last important objection: if the intentionality wholly derives from the 
experience of resistance, does it follow that mere perceptual experiences, in which no 
resistance is apparently involved, have no intrinsic intentionality? In other words, does the 
resistance thesis imply that perceptual object don’t appear as real? This would sound odd. The 
answer to this question introduces an important schism among the upholders of the Resistance 
Thesis.  
 Some answer the objection by subscribing to a generalised resistance thesis. They 
claim that the objects of our ordinary perceptual experiences are all presented to us a resistant. 
Their main argument for this is that we cannot modify what we see or hear at will. So they 
can maintain, every ordinary perceptual experience is intentional in the strong phenomenal 
sense: they present us with the reality of its objects.  
                                                
25 To use the expression of C. Cassam, there is no self-world dualism. Scheler speaks of « extatic knowledge » to 
qualify this kind of non intentional states. 
 Some others consider that generalised resistance is implausible: if we can’t change our 
perceptual contents at will, this is not because those contents resist to us, but only because we 
are not able to form any volition concerning them. This is a case of aboulia, not of resistance. 
They wish to stay closer from the original intuition of Johnson: therefore, they adopt a 
restricted resistance thesis according to which resistance is limited to the paradigmatic cases 
where a muscular effort is involved. As a consequence, only hard, impenetrable, material 
bodies can be felt as resistant, that is, as real. Their answer to the present objection is then to 
make the pills easier to swallow. For one thing, they can insist that ordinary perceptual 
experience may still have a derived intentionality. They can inherit, by association for 
instance, a quasi-feeling of reality from the experience of resistance. Secondly, the fact that 
only material objects or properties are experienced as mind-independent is not a so bad 
consequence, according to them, since the priority given to material objects is also deep-
rooted in commonsense. We want robust facts, solid arguments, and hard or tangible proofs. 
The restricted character of the experience of resistance may explain this ontological priority 
given by commonsense to material entities, which may explain in turn the philosophical 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
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